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ABSTRACT
With the change in Governor at the South African Reserve Bank in August 1999, also came
the announcement by the South African monetary authorities of the decision to move to
formal inflation targeting. There seems, however, to be a lack of understanding by the South
African public on the concepts and issues of inflation targeting and thus the potential benefits.
This is mainly due to the lack of international evidence given that inflation targeting is not
even a decade old yet.
This study was largely motivated by the need for a more comprehensive understanding of the
intricacies of inflation targeting as the future monetary policy strategy. Thus, the aim of this
study is to examine inflation targeting in its entirety and determine whether South Africa is
truly ready for the new age of inflation targeting.
There are three prerequisites for inflation targeting:
1. central bank independence
2. having sole target
3. existence of stable and predictable relationship between monetary policy instrument
and inflation.
In many developing countries, the use of seigniorage revenues as an important source of
financing public debts, the lack of commitment to low inflation as a primary goal by monetary
authorities, considerable exchange rate flexibility, lack of substantial operational
independence of the central bank or of powerful models to make domestic inflation forecasts
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Globally, inflation targeting has become increasingly popular as a monetary policy
framework. The move towards this new approach is primarily a consequence of problems and
shortcomings of other policy frameworks. The appointment of a new governor, Tito
Mboweni at the South African Reserve Bank in August 1999 brought with it, soon afterwards,
an announcement of a more formal Inflation Targeting. In line with the new trend towards
Inflation Targeting, which began in the 90's, South Africa has abandoned its previous
'eclectic' monetary policy in favour of this new approach.
The general public in South Africa appears to be in the dark about the intricacies and
implications of Inflation targeting. . This paper, therefore seeks to move beyond the usual
'traditional' stance on the analysis of South Africa's introduction of Inflation Targeting,
which, it is suggested, has generally tended to be of too superficial a nature. This thesis
attempts, rather courageously, to tackle and analyse the predicament of Inflation Targeting in
South Africa, and to do so from a holistic perspective. It is important to note that South
Africa, due to its unique background that has been caused largely by its history, has unique
status that differentiates it from other developing economies that have recently adapted the
Inflation Targeting framework.
In less than 10 years, South Africa has undergone major social, political, cultural, ideological
and economic transformations. Such extreme transformations have posed several challenges
for South Africa and complicate the straightforward or textbook adoption of Inflation
Targeting.
Regarded as an emerging market, the country falls victim to inconsistent investors using
general emerging market strategies in their country evaluation. The impact of this, as it
pertains to Inflation targeting, is that the resultant volatility in our exchange and interest rates
makes the adoption more multifaceted. This, in tum, affects inflation itself and impacts on
the controllability of inflation by the monetary authorities.
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As monetary policy has moved into a new era, with the changing of the guard, stakeholders
wrestle with issues that the new system has borne. This introduction has been received with
much uncertainty. The stringency of Inflation Targeting has, as this paper seeks to highlight,
been perceived as lacking the more all-encompassing focus of the previous "regime".
Inflation Targeting, by its very nature has only one focal point , thus turning a blind eye to
other factors that are believed to be of equal importance. Such other considerations may
include, for example, growth, employment, redistribution, and supply side measures of
economic policy. The resulting lack of consensus is more than likely to pose a problem to
the adoption of Inflation Targeting, which has, as one of its central requirements the premise
of "buy-in'.
Inflation targeting sets aims for price stability as the ultimate goal of the monetary policy.
South Africa's unique conditions may well be detrimental and possibly dangerous to set goals
for price stability in apparent total disregard of the need for economic growth and
employment creation. The Reserve Bank would not conquer with this and will generally
adhere to its view that the attainment of relative price stability as the exclusive objective of its
policies constitutes the best contribution that the monetary authorities can make to economic
growth and well being. The impact of the Reserve Bank's strict stance is that other key areas
of economic policy are, or at least cannot but be seen as ignored.
Thus, the overall objective of this study is to examine Inflation Targeting in its entirety and to
determine whether this new framework is in fact appropriate and relevant to South Africa in
its unique circumstances.
The potential dangers of Inflation Targeting in South Africa create the need to formulate and
adopt inflation targets within the framework of a more all-encompassing approach, such as
GEAR. Within the GEAR framework, organised labour and other parties can and should be
invited to subscribe to a set of simultaneous and mutually consistent outcomes, within an
acceptable set of future feasible outcomes, the future inflation rates could still be turned into a
mandatory policy objective of overriding importance of the monetary policy. The proposed
framework should incorporate labour-friendly elements in order to achieve acceptance from
the unions. If a more favourable climate is created for organised labour, great participation
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can be achieved and labour unions could be more understanding to the needs for low inflation.
In an ideal world, this monetary framework would ensure that inflation is targeted on the basis
of outcomes for growth and employment that leave no doubt about the authorities' concern
for these quantities.
1.2 Background of Research
Inflation targeting is the central topic among many economic representatives and those
interested in South Africa's economy. It is also an area of monetary policy surrounded by
much uncertainty, as the general public is not sure what to make of it. Given the fact the
Inflation Targeting has only been in existence for just over ten years, it is difficult to
determine whether South Africa is an ideal country for the framework. Although a fair
amount of research has been conducted on inflation targeting in South Africa, the work that
has been done concerns itself primarily with textbook requirements mostly of a technical
nature, for the successful implementation of an Inflation Targeting strategy. My justification
for engaging in this area of research is that Inflation Targeting in South Africa has reached a
stage that necessitates analysis and evaluation. My interest in this area is also based on my
belief that this is an area of monetary policy that needs to be explained on and looked at from
a deeper, more holistic approach. Also, to look at how far it has taken South Africa, since its
inception in late 1999.
This paper, while analysing the general requirements and benefits of Inflation Targeting,
extends to cover areas that seem to have been ignored in the past. South Africa is, and has for
many years been undergoing a process of intense structural changes, which makes the
framework far less straightforward than the academics and monetary authorities would have
the public believe.
The governor of the Reserve Bank, Tito Mboweni introduced the new monetary framework
and moved a way from the eclectic approach tom onetary policy to join the ranks 0 f 0 ther
advanced and emerging economies that have adopted this new framework More than three
years have passed now since this Inflation Targeting was introduced in South Africa, and the
timing seems right for an assessment of the effort until now. The general consensus on
Inflation targeting is positive but the framework is still newer and its applicability to emerging
economies, South Africa included, remains questionable. This would seem to be confirmed
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by the fact that the majority of these economies, presumably for technical and other reasons,
have not yet seen fit to adopt Inflation Targeting strategies.
Various individuals and schools of thought insist on strict technical requirements for Inflation
Targeting which South Africa seems to fulfil, much of the literature ignores many of the
country specific issues. South Africa is dealing with issues that accompany its recent and
current social, economic, cultural, political and ideological transformations and their impact
on monetary policy.
1.3 Motivation For Conducting Research
There is a growing consensus across the globe that low and stable inflation is important for
market driven growth and, as such, the primary task of central banks should be to achieve and
maintain price stability. South Africa is in many a different country comparatively. It is these
unique characteristics which, if not accounted for, may prevent the authorities to make a
success of the policy; South Africa still retains infancy status with regard to its current
monetary framework. It is for this reason that understanding Inflation Targeting within a
broader context is significant and important.
1.4 Value Of The Study
The study's overall intention is to determine the appropriateness of Inflation Targeting to
South Africa and to evaluate the successes of this strategy to date. This study will seek to
provide information that will determine whether the South Africa Reserve Bank has been
correct in its adoption of this framework, and to propose an alternative, m ore all-inclusive
option.
The aims therefore include the following:
1. To describe and analyse the concept of inflation Targeting
2. To analyse the potential advantages 0 f adopting this framework into South African
Monetary policy.
3. To define the prerequisite requirements for the adoption of Inflation Targeting and to
assess whether or not these requirements are met in South Africa.
4. To draw lessons for South Africa from international experience.
- 4-
5. To determine whether Inflation Targeting, given South Africa's unique circumstances,
is suitable to South Africa and can provide the benefits proposed by its advocates.
6. To propose an alternative, more holistic, economic policy framework that is geared
specifically towards South Africa's unique features, conditions and policy needs.
1.5 Problem Statement
Is inflation targeting appropriate and relevant to the South African economy as a developing
country with a unique history? Is the South African Reserve Bank within its rights in
adjusting the interest rates in order to meet the inflation target?
1.6 Objectives Of The Study
The purpose of this paper is to determine the appropriateness of inflation targeting to South
Africa and to evaluate the successes its feasibility. The main focus will be on the assessment
ofwhether preconditions of inflation targeting are satisfied in South Africa.
- central bank independence,
- having sole target
- existence of a stable relationship between the monetary policy instruments and inflation.
There are studies questioning the position of the South African Reserve Bank in terms of
independence and analysing the effects of fiscal dominance and fiscal burden on inflationary
expectations. However, they do not pay too much attention to the relationships between the
monetary policy instruments and inflation. This study will seek to provide information that
will determine whether South African Reserve bank has been correct in its adoption of this
framework, and to propose an alternative, more all-encompassing option.
1.7 Limitations Of The Study
Qualitative research methods by their very nature have more shortcomings than do
quantitative methods, being more open to interpretation, thus possibly more subjective.
Findings in this study may not be generalised due to the fact that many of the issues discussed
for their relevance to inflation, or inflation forecasting, do not lend themselves to
incorporation into econometric models. Various premises that this study relies on have not
been tested empirically, while those that have are subject to much debate.
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1.8 Research Methodology
According to Copper & Schindler (2001), "A research methodology is a plan which includes
every aspect 0 f a proposed research study from the conceptualisation 0 fthe problem right
through to the dissemination of the findings". The research design to be used in this study can
be described as a mixture of the exploratory and the (causal) quantitative-descriptive designs.
Copper & Schindler (200 I) describe an exploratory research as an investigation aimed at
refining concepts as well as the development of questions and hypothesis for further research.
Very little formal research to investigate the appropriateness of Inflation targeting as a
monetary framework in South Africa has been carried out, this study is exploratory; and
because the study aims to describe the perceptions of monetary authorities regarding
appropriateness to South Africa., it can be regarded as descriptive in nature. Collins (1987)
maintains that (causal) quantitative-descriptive design mainly serves to reveal potential
relationships between variables.
1.10 Summary
The overall objective of this study is to determine the appropriateness of Inflation Targeting
to South Africa, or of South Africa's suitability for inflation Targeting. For this reason, I will
produce information that will assist in the determination of whether the South African
Reserve Bank has been correct in their adoption of this framework, and to propose an
alternative, more all-encompassing option.
The research design used in this study in terms of Cooper & Schindler (2001) can be termed
as a mixture of exploratory and the (causal) quantitative-descriptive designs.
1.11 Use Of References
Several Acknowledged reference methods exist. For the sake of uniformity, I have used a
modified version of the Harvard method. The author's name, date of publication and page
number are provided in the text. A bibliography arranged alphabetically, according to the
author's surnames, is provided at the end of the study.
- 6 -
CHAPTER 2
INFLATION TARGETING: THEORY AND EVIDENCE
2.1 Introduction
A prerequisite to understanding Inflation Targeting as a monetary framework for South Africa
is an understanding of what Inflation Targeting is. In this chapter I aim (1) to provide a
definition of Inflation Targeting as provided by Bemake and Mishkin (1997), and (2) briefly
analyse this definition, using appropriate and relevant theories.
2.2 Definition
Literature provides vanous, but broadly similar and overlapping, definitions of Inflation
Targeting'. Bemanke and Mishkin (1997) present a standard definition of Inflation Targeting
for purposes of this chapter. They define Inflation Targeting as "a framework for monetary
policy characterized by the public announcement of official quantitative targets (or target
ranges) for the inflation rate over one or more time horizons, and by explicit
acknowledgement that low, stable inflation is monetary policy's primary long-run goal".
Among other important features of Inflation Targeting are vigorous efforts to communicate
with the public about the plans and objectives of the monetary authorities, and, in many cases,
mechanisms that strengthen the Central Bank's accountability for attaining those objectives.
The above definition emphasises the fundamental elements of Inflation Targeting. It
highlights the fact that Inflation Targeting does not simply mean the setting of a target for the
inflation rate; but it does mean the adoption of a framework for application. As such, it
consists of the following elements:
• A public announcement of the adoption of an explicit Inflation Targeting framework
• Official quantitative targets to be achieved through the Inflation Targeting framework
• Price stability as the long run goal of monetary policy
1 See, for example, Almeida A. & Goodhart C.A.E (1998); Debelle, G., (1997); Masson, Savastano, and
Sharama (1997) ; and Svensson 91996)
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• Communication to the public on the nature, rationale and importance of Inflation
Targeting
• Accountability of the Central Bank for the attainment (or non-attainment) of the set
inflation targets.
• An information framework, which includes the analysis of all relevant economic
indicators, not only monetary indicators.
2.3 Nature of Inflation Targeting
A distinction of Inflation Targeting, as opposed to other monetary frameworks, is that
Inflation Targeting has inflation as its sole target. Other variables, such as the nominal
exchange rate or the money supply, are subordinated in favour of the inflation target. This
point is relevant to a country like South Africa where exchange rate volatility is notably
higher than in most developed countries where Inflation Targeting has been implemented,
making it increasingly difficult to ignore the influence of the nominal exchange rate
(particularly in short term). It is important to note that certain anomalies exist, whereby
countries that define themselves as targeters, such as Israel, have explicit targets for both
inflation and the exchange rates.
Inflation Targeting creates an infrastructure whereby countries take a forward-looking
approach in policy making, such that the forecasted future inflation rate becomes the
intermediate target (although inflation targeters have no option but to look at past behaviour
as a first approximate guide to the future). The difference between Inflation Targeting and
other monetary frameworks is vis-a-vis authorities who are responding (largely) to current, or
the most recent developments. The forward looking-ness arises from the fact that the
authorities have no choice but to recognise the lags in effect oftheir policy actions.
Inflation targeting is multi-faceted. As such, certain requirements exist in order to adopt the
framework2• This includes the absence of fiscal dominance and a specific goal of monetary
policy. Once framework is implemented the Central Bank typically finds itself constrained to
adopt supporting modifications of its behaviour, such as enabling communication leading to
increased openness and transparency
2 Discussed in detail in Chapter 4.
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Proponents of Inflation Targeting advocate the advantages of the framework. A nominal
anchor i s provided for t he anchoring 0 f inflationary expectation, while having government
"buy-in" ensures that the fiscal authorities keep their side of the deal regarding the
government wage bill and administered prices.
There are, however, other factors that are problematic and that make the straightforward
adoption of Inflation Targeting difficult. Undeniably, it is still largely uncertain whether
Inflation Targeting will b ear the anticipated fruit and whether its advantages outweigh the
disadvantages.
2.4 Review of the Literature
A number of studies have investigated both theoretically and empirically the
inflation targeting framework as a monetary policy regime. Some of them discuss the
issues of inflation targeting in developing countries, conditions for successful inflation
targeting, the reasons why these countries switch to inflation targeting regime, and to
what extent these conditions are satisfied in developing countries. 0 thers evaluate
inflation targeting as a monetary policy strategy in particular countries by offering
empirical models to assess the feasibility of inflation targeting in these countries. There are
some studies analyzing the relevance of inflation targeting regime for developing countries.
Masson, Savastano, and Sharma (1997) examine the applicability of inflation targeting to
developing countries. They argue that in most of the developing countries the requirements of
inflation targeting are absent due to the seigniorages being an important source of financing
or due to the lack of consensus on low inflation as a primary objective.
Kadioglu, Ozdemir, and Yilmaz (2000) discuss the applicability and prerequisites of inflation
targeting in developing countries. They analyze the general aspects of inflation targeting
regime i n developed countries a nd study t he scope for inflation targeting i n t he
developing countries by giving some examples of country experiences. They come up
with the result that in many developing countries, the preconditions of inflation
targeting are not satisfied and that they do not have powerful models which enable them to
make successful inflation forecasts. Although they claim that it is too early for some
developing countries to apply inflation targeting regime they provide some country cases
where they show that the regime has successful results in developing countries. They
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relate the success in Chile to the absence of fiscal deficits, the rigorous regulations and
supervision of financial system and substantial hardening of the targets, in Israel, to the
credibility obtained by pre-emptive actions taken by the monetary authorities when a
deviation from the target is foreseen.
Jonas (1998) summarizes the reasons why many countries including developing countries
switch to inflation targeting regime by using the cases of Czech Republic and Poland as a
reference. The reasons are the inadequacy of exchange rate targeting due to the increasing
capital mobility in the 1990s and of monetary targeting due to financial innovations, and
the desire of some of the transition economies to join the European Monetary Union
(EMU), which requires a clear target for disinflation.
Mishkin (2000) explains what inflation targeting involves for emerging market economies by
discussing the advantages and disadvantages of this regime and making a reference to
Chile's experience of inflation targeting. He claims that inflation targeting may not be
appropriate for many emerging countries because weak central bank accountability is a
serious problem, which results from long lags from monetary policy instruments to the
inflation outcome, and also, because financial instability caused by flexible exchange
rate required by inflation targeting is a relevant fact for these countries.
Moreover, he reveals that fiscal dominance and high degree of dollarization, which may
create severe problems for inflation targeting regime, are common features of emerging
market economies. There are many studies that judge whether or not inflation targeting is
feasible in particular countries by offering theoretical or empirical evidence.
Hazirolan (1999) assesses the applicability of the inflation-targeting regime for Turkish
economy and gives a proposal to implement it in Turkey. He claims that to get satisfactory
results from inflation targeting Turkey first needs a successful disinflation period.
Jonsson (1999) examines the implications and relative merits of inflation targeting for South
Africa ina theoretical framework a nd concludes t hat although South Africa satisfies the
main prerequisites of inflation targeting such as central bank independence, lack of
commitment to macroeconomic objectives which might be in conflict with low inflation
and relatively developed capital and money markets, a refinement of the inflation
forecasting framework of the South African Reserve Bank and further experience with the
operational aspects of the repurchase system are needed before the implementation of
inflation targeting.
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Woglom (2000) provides empirical evidence to judge whether South Africa is a good
candidate for inflation targeting. He uses vector auto-regressions (VARs) to analyze the
dynamic interaction 0 f t he variables 0 f interest 1 ike a monetary instrument, t he price
level, the real GDP and the nominal exchange rate. He makes comparisons between
South Africa and pre-target periods of New Zealand and Canada and argues that South Africa
is not a good candidate for CPI inflation targeting due to the loss in benefits provided by a
fully flexible exchange rate. Because according to his model, a perfectly flexible exchange
rate has the advantage of providing complete automatic stabilization of IS shocks. CPI
inflation targeting causes the exchange rate to be less flexible in response to external shocks.
As a result, the CPI inflation targeting partially remove some of the stabilization
advantages of completely flexible exchange rates.
Gottschalk and Moore (2001) also make use of VARs m order to provide empirical
evidence on the links between the monetary policy instruments and inflation in Poland. They
examine the effects of an exchange rate shock and interest rate shock on the price level. The
results show that although the exchange rate seems to be effective with respect to output and
prices, the direct 1inkages between the interest rate and inflation don ot appear to be very
strong. This requires a better understanding of the links between the monetary policy
instruments and inflation target.
Christoffersen, Slok and Wescott (2001) claim that Poland appears to be ready for
inflation targeting. They too analyze the statistical linkages between monetary policy
instruments and inflation, and also between leading indicators of inflation and inflation itself
by performing Granger causality tests. They observe that there are significant relationships
between the CPI and various leading indicators of inflation. They also reveal that although
there IS a predictable linkage between the exchange rate and inflation measures, the
relationships between the changes in the short-term interest rates and changes in inflation
are weak. However, they argue that as the Polish economy matures and stabilization is
completed, the relationship between the policy interest rates and inflation will be more
regular.
2.5 Summary
The adoption of an Inflation Targeting strategy means a public announcement by monetary
authorities for the attainment of a specified, quantified target for one or more inflation rates
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over a certain future time period, or at some future point of time, on the understanding that
price stability is the long-run goal ofmonetary policy.
The various definitions of Inflation Targeting incorporate defining features of the framework
and highlight requirements that have to be met to facilitate its application. For example,
because Inflation Targeting typically inspires increased communication with the public, the
abandonment of other anchors, and generally promotes increased transparency; these elements
are factors that the authorities will feel constrained to put in place as a foundation for the
framework and its implementation. However, while these elements are important, they are
not unique to Inflation Targeting. It is important, therefore, to distinguish between defining
Inflation Targeting and identifying the features of monetary policy that are generally seen as
essential for the framework to be implemented. These will be laid out in Chapter 4.
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CHAPTER 3
THE CASE FOR INFLATION TARGETING
3.1 Introduction
This chapter deals with the question of why has a move towards Inflation Targeting become
so prominent amongst Central Banks around the world.
The 1990's can be identified as the era of Inflation Targeting, with several developed
economies, such as the UK, Canada, New Zealand and Australia, as well as various
developing economies, such as Chile, Brazil, and now South Africa, adopting the "new"
framework.
Combined with an assessment of the strengths of Inflation Targeting, this section analyses the
rationale and advantages claimed for this monetary policy framework. Analysing the
advantages of Inflation Targeting will yield valuable information for the application of
Inflation Targeting in South Africa, as well as yielding insight into the rationale for its
adoption.
3.2 The Reasons for Adoption
Although the move towards Inflation Targeting seems to have occurred across the board, the
countries that have adopted this framework, along with certain commonalities, reveal
divergent key characteristics, for example, as regards the monetary and fiscal climate. These
disparities seem to point toward the idea that the reasons for the adoption of Inflation
Targeting can differ across countries.
The prime motives for the adoption ofInflation Targeting have been identified as follows:
1. Inflation Targeting providing a nominal anchor for inflationary expectations.
2. Inflation Targeting inducing increased Central Bank accountability.
3. Difficulties in establishment of Central Bank credibility, as inflationary expectations
are unclear and difficult to change.
4. Obstacles to an evaluation of the Central Bank's performance.
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The move towards Inflation Targeting as a monetary policy framework, over the past decade,
has occurred for a number of reasons. Primarily, this shift has been a consequence of the
failure of other policy frameworks, such as, fixed exchange rate regimes in the case of Brazil,
Chile, Sweden, and other countries. Elsewhere, Inflation Targeting has replaced more
discretionary or eclectic policy approaches. Examples of such cases include Canada, New
Zealand and South Africa.
In the case of the United Kingdom, Sweden, and Finland, Inflation Targeting was introduced
in response to the failure of a fixed exchange rate regime. In Spain, Inflation Targeting was
adopted primarily because of the failure of the use of an exchange rate target and of a
monetary targeting regime.
Goodhart (1988:27) identifies two key reasons for the abandonment of a discretionary
monetary policy in favour ofInflation Targeting. Firstly, it makes the Central Bank more
accountable, because the bank now has a specified target to achieve. Mishkin (2000:19)
would concur with this statement and emphasizes that the Central Bank's increased
accountability prevents it from falling into a time inconsistency trap. Secondly, a normal
anchor is required for a gelling of inflationary expectations.
Another reason for the adoption of Inflation Targeting replacing discretionary policy is that
the Bank's performance under Inflation Targeting can be evaluated more effectively.
Inflation Targeting makes evaluation unambiguous. The target is either hit or missed,
whereas under an eclectic approach, accountability in its strict sense cannot exist - for lack of
a clean or firm specification ofwhat the Bank is or has been aiming at.
3.3 The Case for Inflation Targeting
Inflation targeting accepts the validity of four important propositions (Masson et aI., 1997:5):
Money is neutral in the long run, i.e. - an increase in the money supply ultimately affects only
the price level in the long run, and has no effect on economic activity. Inflation is undesirable
in terms of its negative effects on resource allocation and on long-run growth. Money is not
neutral in the short run and as such manifestations on real variables, the extent of which is
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largely unknown. Monetary policy affects inflation with lags of an uncertain duration, pattern
and extent.
Although the above propositions are often presented in various literature sources as arguments
in favour 0 f Inflation Targeting, it is vital to understand that t hey are reasons for fighting
inflation, but do not necessarily make a case for the adoption of inflation Targeting. That
case, therefore has to be based on benefits claimed specifically for Inflation Targeting.
3.4 Advantages of Inflation Targeting
The primary aim of Inflation Targeting is to facilitate or allow for the attainment of low levels
of inflation while increasing the possibility of economic growth (Jonsson, 1999:2). The
Central Bank is prevented from using monetary policy for short-term gain, as the likelihood of
missing the target would thereby be increased. The bank commits to a target and through a
process of communication and openness a greater degree of certainty is created in the
markets.
Inflation Targeting has various advantages when compared with other monetary regimes. The
public easily understands an inflation target, for example, when compared with a monetary
target. When compared with an exchange rate target, Inflation Targeting allows policy
makers greater freedom to respond to internal domestic considerations. (Mishkin, 1999:12)
Inflation Targeting may lead to better cyclical adjustment in the economy, because it can
potentially provide greater flexibility to deal with shocks (Jonsson, 1999:6). In the face of a
positive demand shock for example - resulting in inflationary pressure and an increase in the
output gap - the Inflation Targeting policy response would be to tighten monetary conditions
and to shrink the output gap. Shocks to the velocity of circulation are no longer an important
consideration, because Inflation Targeting targets the ultimate goal variable (inflation), as
opposed to an intermediate variable (money supply). As a result, the relationship between
money supply and inflation becomes irrelevant. Similar considerations may apply in cases of
supply shocks". An Inflation Targeting framework, compared with an exchange rate targeting
4 An area of concern, however are supply shocks - such as an international oil price increase - that induce
accelerated measured inflation but simultaneously brake economic growth and create employment. In these
cases, unqualified adherence to the inflation target may well prove destabilising to the real economy.
- 15 -
framework provides a greater amount of flexibility to deal with these shocks in a more stable
environment.
Mishkin (1999:3) identifies several advantages and disadvantages of exchange rate targeting:
The nominal anchor of an exchange rate target establishes the inflation rate or internationally
traded goods and ultimately contributes to the improved control of inflation.
A credible exchange rate anchors inflation expectations to the inflation rate in the low-
inflation country to whose country it is pegged.
The time-inconsistency problem is alleviated because the exchange rate target provides an
automatic rule for the conduct of monetary policy.
The simplicity and clarity of exchange rate targets means that the public easily understands it.
(Mishkin, & Posen, 1997 5,6)
Exchange rate targeting does have several costs and limitations:
• Loss of independent monetary policy because the peg imposes severe constraints on
the ability of the authorities to use monetary policy for other purposes. This can result
in a high cost to economic growth.
• Obstfeld and Rogoff (in Bernanke et al, 1999:303) have indicated that, in a world of
highly mobile capital, fixed exchange rate regimes leave countries wide open to
speculative attacks on their currencies.
• Elimination of the important signal that the bond market provides about the stance of
monetary policy, which thus weakens the accountability of policy makers and the
Central Bank.
• Exchange rate pegs do not solve the problem of maintaining price3 stability but rather
they transfer the problem to another country. In addition, an exchange rate target does
not guarantee that the monetary authorities will be sufficiently committed to
maintaining the target.
3.5 Disadvantages Of Inflation Targeting
Inflation Targeting along with its advantages also reveals certain disadvantages. Bernake and
Mishkin (1999) identify several key disadvantages. In a 200 publication they make a
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distinction in the disadvantages identified by noting that the first four are relevant to emerging
economies, whereas five to 9 are particularly important to these economies.
The first four are as follows:
1. Inflation targeting is too rigid:
2. The framework allows for too much discretion:
3. Potential exists for Inflation Targeting to increase output instability"
4. Inflation targeting lowers economic growth:
The suggestion that the first four disadvantages are not relevant to developing economies
may, however, be a little presumptuous in South Africa's case. Inflation targeting may indeed
lower economic growth as well as potentially create output instability. Moreover, in the face
of severe economic shocks, the inflexibility of Inflation Targeting may cause the economy to
be pushed into a downsizing, or may worsen the effects of a recession.
Bernanke and Mishkin's remaining disadvantages may be listed as follows:
1. Inflation Targeting can only produce weak Central Bank's accountability. Because of
the effects of lags inflation is difficult to control, particularly in emerging economies.
In the case of South Africa, this may well be relevant - the lags are of an uncertain
duration.
2. The incidence of Government- controlled pnces on the index used to compute
headline inflation is a matter for concern (Mishkin 2000:5). Administered prices in
south Africa over the past year have risen significantly faster that both the CPI and the
CPIX.
3. Inflation Targeting cannot prevent 'fiscal dominance'. Governments can still operate
without fiscal discipline, leading to large budgetary deficits and eventually causing the
breakdown of the Inflation Targeting regime. Through monetization, the fiscal deficit
or the public debt will be eroded, leading to high inflation.
4. Exchange rate flexibility required by Inflation Targeting may cause financial
instability. This point is of considerable interest for most developing economies. It
has been contended that much of the recent exchange rate volatility that has bee
experienced inS outh Africa 0 ccurred because it was known that the Reserve B ank
would try to defend the currency. It could be argued, however, that Mishkin's
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specimen cases may also be looked at from another perspective, i.e that the defence of
an increasingly unrealistic exchange rate may itself become the cause of instability.
5. Dollarization: In certain developing economies a substantial portion of long-term debt
is likely to be in dollars. This creates an environment of potential financial instability.
Mishkin (2000) suggest a possible chain of causation as follows:
The dollarized economy experiences currency depreciation, resulting from an external shock.
The depreciation increases the burden of dollar-denominated debt, thus, depending on the
degree of depreciation, increasing the likelihood of a financial crisis. A potential incongruity
exists. This type of disaster struck the south East Asian economies in 1997 to 1998: the
countries concerned, however, were 0 n fixed exchange rates rather than pursuing Inflation
Targeting.
Mishkin's argument suggests that certain emerging market economies, those with a large
portion 0 f dollar-denominated debt, should not use Inflation Targeting as a framework for
Monetary Policy, unless there is strict supervision of financial institutions and the economy is
capable of absorbing external shocks. The conclusion suggested by Mishkin corresponds to
the conclusions drawn from the 1997-98 disasters: again, however, these countries were not
inflation targeters.
What measure of inflation should be targeted? The choice of index involves a
trade-off of inflation controllability versus the ability to influence expectations. If a common
measure, such as the CPI, is used because it is entrenched in public perception, Inflation
Targeting has a greater ability to influence expectations than in the case of a more artificial
index (which the authorities may well have greater control over). When the measure has
significant exclusions, inflation becomes more controllable and the Bank is more likely to hit
the target. In these circumstances, however, the effect on inflationary expectations is not as
good as with the a common index. The public has a perceptions of what the inflation is and
this perception is generally based 0 n C PI inflation. A n artificial index will 0 nly have the
ability to influence expectations when the Bank has pre-established credibility, which is not
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usually the case with emerging market economies. As one Czechoslovakian union worker
said "We don't consume 'net' inflation'".
Reasonably, the public is sensitive to what it considers to be the comprehensive "cost of
living". Where households carry much debt, interest rates are surely important to them, even
if there is a more continuous awareness of the "supermarket type" price increases.
3.6 Summary
The above analysis illustrates that, potentially, Inflation Targeting has strong advantages. The
provision of a nominal anchor for inflationary expectations, along with the effects of
credibility, openness and transparency, are undeniably important advantages of Inflation
Targeting. They can, however, be achieved without operating in an Inflation Targeting
environment. Similarly a public understanding of the stance of monetary policy can be
achieved in other monetary regimes.
As Mishkin notes, various shortcomings exist within the framework, many of which are
relevant to developing nations. Factors such as the requirements of not anchoring the
exchange rate, as well as the effect of government-administered prices (which are of
particular concern in South Africa), can complicate the framework and outweigh the potential
advantages.
5 Net inflation is the index used for Inflation Targeting in the Czech Republic. It is a new indicator, which
measures changes in CPI excluding movements in regulated prices ad adjusted for the impact on the remaining
items of changed in indirect taxes or subsidy elimination.
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CHAPTER 4
REQUIREMENTS AND FEATURES OF AN INFLATION TARGETING
FRAMEWORK
4.1 Introduction
Inflation Targeting is a monetary policy framework that has certain features and prerequisites
that need to be met in order for the framework to be implemented. This section investigates
these characteristics and requirements.
4.2 Requirements
Literature (Masson et al 1997) reveals several requirements that act as prerequisites for the
use of Inflation Targeting as a guide for monetary policy:
4.2.1 Central Bank Independence And Fiscal Dominance
A crucial issue when considering the implementation of inflation targets is the matter of
Central Bank independence. According to Masson et al (1997), independence does not
necessarily require goal independence, but must enable the Bank to achieve the goal as
desired. A relationship exists between instrument independence and fiscal dominance
(Debelle: 1997). The Central Bank must not be required to finance the government budget.
Although this form of central Bank freedom is helpful in most monetary control systems, it is
an essential element of Inflation Targeting.
Governments, in certain circumstances have an incentive to see higher inflation figures, as,
e.g, with a view to see-through revenue (Sherwin:2000). In such cases it becomes
increasingly difficult for a Central Bank to attain a low level of inflation when it cannot
operate independently. This relates specifically to instrument independence. The
government should playa role in the actual setting of the target variable. This is a cardinal
advantage of Inflation Targeting, in that the government can effectively 'buy into' the target.
This facilitates a process whereby the government does, or is at least motivated to do, its part
to ensure the attainment of the target.
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Moreover, within a fiscally driven economy the presence of seigniorage revenue creation may
destabilise policy and create inflationary pressures within the economy, which makes
effective Inflation Targeting untenable.
Sherwin refers to the concept of 'democratic legitimacy', which is created once the goal has
been jointly set. Sherwin (2000:4) states that" an independent Central Bank specifically
charged with maintaining price stability, effectively empowered and resourced to do the job,
and held accountable against the achievement of that objective, is a fairly logical response to
dealing with an inherent inflationary bias by institutionalising a country bias in favour of
long-run price stability".
The importance of instrument independence and joint target setting by the government and the
Central Bank was emphasised by current Reserve Bank Governor, Tito Mboweni, in a speech
in September 1999. He said, "the inflation target may be jointly set by the government and
the Central bank. However, once the target has been determined the Central Bank should be
free to use any instrument to achieve the ultimate objective" (Mboweni,2000:3). Mboweni's
statement is potentially troublesome in that it presumes that the B ank i s free to use" any"
instruments, as opposed to recognised "market-orientated instruments" only.
The question could be asked if, in extreme circumstances, there could be a case for a
ministerial right of intervention, even as this pertains to the potentially extreme use of policy
instruments. Surely the bank only has the mandate to use the recognised market-orientated
instruments? And also: if the governor goes beyond his mandate the Minister of Finance,
having subscribed to the target and having certain responsibility for the target, should be able
to intervene. The ministerial right of intervention would diminish further any remaining
"democratic deficit".
4.2.2 No Commitment To Any Other Nominal Variable
Within the Inflation Targeting framework the monetary authority is required not to have any
commitment to the level or path of any other nominal variable, such as wages ot the nominal
exchange rate (Masson: 1997:8). Exchange rate targeting, and particularly the maintenance of
a fixed exchange rate, subordinates monetary policy decisions in favour of the exchange rate.
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A pertinent choice is required between defending the exchange rate and steering inflation. An
inflation target can increase certainty, as the markets are c lear about the Bank's priorities.
The existence of an additional commitment to the exchange rate, on the other hand, cannot but
create uncertainty as to the Banks's priorities. The rationale behind this can be found in
certain circumstances where a government or its Central Bank aims to maintain a fixed
exchange rate and at the same time aiming at an inflation target. As a result, the exchange
rate may find itself placed under immense pressure and the Bank is required to decide which
variable to defend. Whichever variable is protected - a decision that is usually based on
failure to defend the other variable - results in an inescapable loss in credibility.
According to Mishkin, the exchange rate issue can be be encountered by stabilising the short-
term exchange rate movements, whilst making it clear to the public that they will allow
exchange rates to reach their market-determined level over longer time periods. The problem
arises, in South Africa, that it is difficult to determine to what degree the Bank is stabilising
the exchange rate as opposed to playing a role in its determination. This problem is
aggravated when large volatility exists within the economy.
4.2.3 The Effectiveness Of Monetary Policy
The relationship between policy actions and inflation must be relatively stable and
forecastable. The tools used by the authorities need to be effective in their control of
inflation. The monetary policy instruments should be a market-orientated and avoid direct
action, such as credit ceilings. The monetary policy instruments should have a stable
relationship with inflation (Debelle: 1997). The reasons for this are obvious: if monetary
policy is not effective in controlling inflation, or if the effect of policy measures cannot be
adequately foreseen, inflation is not a variable that can be targeted with any accuracy.
4.2.4 Well Developed Money And Capital Markets
Well-developed money and capital markets are needed for three reasons. Firstly, to avoid
"fiscal dominance". Secondly, because in the absence of such markets the Central Bank will
not be able to conduct market-orientated policies. Thirdly, because only in such markets can
the Central Bank's market operations be relied on to be effective without becoming
disruptive.
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Within a well-developed financial environment, policy changes by the Central Bank must
effect money market interest rates in a clear and transparent manner. According to Masson et
al (1997), shallow capital markets arise from government schemes to extract revenue from the
financial system. Other manifestations of shallow capital markets include limited access to
foreign funding.
4.2.5 Sophisticated Model for the Forecasting Of Inflation Targeting
The difference between Inflation Targeting and other policy frameworks is that Inflation
Targeting (ideally) makes forecasting explicit and transparent (Mboweni:1999). Some form
of forecasting model is probably the most essential of the requirements for Inflation Targeting
in that the framework stands or falls, with or without forecasting and some predictability of
the effect ofpolicy measures. In South Africa the model is still in the process of being refined
and only serves as the first point for discussion. In this case it is debatable whether the
requirement is really being met.
4.2.6 It Should Be Embraced By All
The decision to make inflation the focal point, within an Inflation Targeting framework
should be authorised by all stakeholders. The Reserve Bank cannot attain the target alone, or
can do so only at a price of unacceptable hardships. In order for price and wage setting to be
influenced, participation from all areas is required. All stakeholders need to agree that
explicit Inflation Targeting is the correct framework for the country at the given point in time.
The situation requires collaboration. A fundamental challenge to this collaboration exists.
Both organised labour and the public may well be inadequately knowledgeable and are only
dimly aware of what they are agreeing to and the implications. Often times, they do not take
the target seriously or wish to insist on provisos once the potential consequences of Inflation
Targeting become clear to them. The point assumes a special importance in South Africa to
the extent that labour union-driven pressures on labour costs, and the permissive effects of
unduly labour-friendly legislation, can be held accountable for much of the apparent
intractability of inflation in South Africa.
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4.2.7 The Inflation Rate Should Not Be Unusually High To Begin With
The higher the inflation rate is, the more difficult and less accurate forecasting becomes
(Mishkin: 2000). An unusually high inflation rate is potentially problematic in the case of
South Africa. Inflation in most developed countries is significantly lower than that in South
Africa.
An additional requirement suggested is t hat Inflation Targeting should be accompanied by
increased accountability, transparency, and communication. Although these elements were
introduced as advantages of Inflation Targeting, it is important to ensure that they are present,
so as to reap the benefits of increased transparency (Debelle: 1997).
4.3 Features of the Inflation Targeting Strategy
Inflation Targeting, as a monetary policy framework, has four central features:
4.3.1 Nature ofthe Target
The Central Bank and the Government, depending on the nature of the Central Bank's
independence, must determine an optimal Inflation Targeting strategy and whether a point or
band should be targeted. Various factors must be considered; the width of the band, for
example, is vital in ensuring Central Bank credibility. It iss uggested that if t he effect 0 f
monetary policy on inflation is unclear, as it generally is in developing countries, a band
would be preferable (Svenson:1997). The crucial element is the width of the band chosen.
This is important from a credibility point of view. If the target band is too wide, the Central
Bank runs the risk of losing credibility, whereas if the band is too narrow, the likelihood of
missing the target is greater (CREFSA: 1998). The band should depepnd on size of the
economy and economic stability - the smaller and more unstable the economy, the larger the
target band.
The second point deserving consideration is the speed at which inflation should be brought
down. According to CREFSA (1998), the preferred speed of the disinflation process is
gradual. Canada aimed at a two-percentage points reduction the first year, and subsequently
at reductions of half a percentage point in successive 18-month periods. Inflation Targeting
was adopted when inflation was about 5 percent. Within transitional economies inflation is
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decreased gradually Poland targeted a decrease in inflation from 11 percent to 8 percent in the
first year of targeting.
4.3.2 What Inflation Measure Should Be Targeted
The measure of Inflation to be targeted must be determined (see Table 2 for inflation
indexes). Headline inflation is more susceptible to external shocks, which may also falsify
the picture of the current "inherent inflationariness" of the economy. A variation in the CPI,
as in South Africa's case, may be an easier variable to target, although it may not be seen as,
in the minds of the public, either the most relevant or the most readily understandable
measure of inflation.
A relevant consideration in fighting inflation would seem to be: what notion or measurement
of inflation is most likely to provoke defensive reactions from price makers, that will
themselves tend to sustain or accelerate inflation? If economic subjects are concerned about
their living standards, the index might well have to include items such as taxes (VAT), fines
and levies and interest rates on various types of household debt. It is also relevant to note that
rapid structural change in the economy, shifts in income distribution patterns, social changes
and improvements in basic living conditions (as well as occasional deteriorations in basic
structure), and rapid technological developments in consumer goods and services, would tend
to make surveys of household expenditures outdated and render existing consumer price
indices less relevant.
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Table 2. Inflation indexes used in selected countries
Country New Zealand Canada United Finland Australia Sweden Spain
Kingdom
Inflation Underlying CPI CPI Retail Underlying Underlying CPI CPI





Factors Interest cost None, Mortgage Mortgage Mortgage None None
excluded component, underlying interest interest interest
fromCPI indirect taxes, inflation rate payments payments, payments,
government used indirect taxes, indirect
changes and operationally government taxes, other
significant subsidies, volatile
changes in the house prices items
terms of trade
Source:Masson et al: 1997
4.3.3 Flexibility
Prior to the implementation of Inflation Targeting the crucial question of flexibility in the face
of external shocks needs to be answered. A Central Bank can opt for setting certain escape
clauses to allow for external shocks that are outside the control of the Bank. It must be noted,
however, that much thought should be given to this in advance. If not, the Bank will lose
credibility for the ex post, seemingly "opportunistic", adding of new escape clauses (and the
Bank could excessively accommodate external shocks). "The series needs to be considered
accurate, timely and readily understandable by the public, but may also need to allow for
individual price shocks or one time shocks that do not affect trend inflation which is what
monetary policy should influence" (Bernanke and Mishkin, 1997:16) Flexibility may
complicate these issues. Too much flexibility may result in a loss of credibility",
6 It is noteworthy that many of the extremely successful Inflation Targeting Central Banks seem mostly to have
been hesitant to respond in a stimulatory way to undershoots of the inflation target.
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4.3.4 Predictability OfInflation
An important question when deciding on Inflation Targeting as a monetary framework is
whether inflation is sufficiently predictable to be targeted. Bernanke (1997) points out two
reasons why this is important. Due to lags between the policy action and its effect on
inflation, under circumstances of low predictability the target would be difficult to hit and
possibly, if the target is hit, this could be due to luck rather than to effective forecasting and
an apt conduct of monetary policy. Secondly, if inflation is largely erratic and the target is
missed, and for this reason credibility lost, it will be difficult to determine whether this
occurred due to 'misfortune' or 'bad faith'. "The central Bank could argue that the wide
misses were the result of bad luck, as opposed to bad faith, since the Central Bank's forecasts
of inflation contain substantial judgemental components and such would be difficult to
disprove" (Bernanke and Mishkin, 1997:18) This would weaken the argument that Inflation
Targeting would increase accountability, with the result that building up credibility could be a
difficult process.
4.3.5 The Democratic Deficit
Closely related to the Central Bank independence is the legitimate concern about the so-
called, "democratic deficit". This relates to an independent Central Bank operating as a sort
of mini government, "ruling" alongside the actual government but beyond the direct or
indirect supervision and control of the people's parliamentary representatives. Concerns have
been raised regarding the undemocratic nature of such a situation (Almeida and
Goodhart:1998). For example, the Central Bank may come to use its instruments in such a
way as to aggravate an already dismal real economy situation. If the government is opposed
to this strategy, but the Central Bank refuses to make the necessary adjustments, the
democratic nature of the country's economic management is compromised.
4.3.6 An Anomaly Regarding The So-Called Escape Clauses
As noted earlier, targets are subject to being missed due to unforeseen and (frequently)
unforeseeable external and internal shocks which, ina ny case, would 0 ften be beyond the
control of the monetary authority and may very well not allow for adequate countervailing
action within relevant periods of time. Commentators suggest that because of this, Central
Banks should specify "escape clauses". In circumstances when the inflation target is not, or
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does not appear to be sustainable, the Bank may enact an escape clause. These escape clauses
have become subject to much criticism (McCullen: 1996)
A case in point is t hat of New Zealand. N ew Zealand is 0 ne 0 f t he best known inflation
targeters in history. Its success, although fairly controversial, has become the subject of much
literature in Central Bank economics.
Reasons for escape clauses concentrate on inflation targets being missed because of "bad
luck." But targets may also be hit because of "good" or" bad luck", or missed despite "good
luck." In other words, performance should be evaluated as independent of all forms of luck.
4.3.7 The Importance Of The Technical Requirements
The technical requirements set out by Masson et al (1997) and others are undeniably
important. They cannot, however be analysed in isolation: elements in the socio-political
environment may well be of similar or more decisive importance. Factors such as labour
market conditions, unemployment or income inequalities based on race, which have strong
effects (albeit difficult to measure) on the outcome of the policy framework, therefore need to
be considered along with the more purely technical requirements.
4.4 Summary
The application of Inflation targeting depends on the fulfilment of a variety of preconditions.
Factors such as an absence of fiscal dominance and the role assigned to monetary policy are
vital in deciding on the implementation of an inflation Targeting regime. While these factors
are important, circumstances that are unique to a country also need to be granted
consideration. Given that their effects often cannot be clearly determined, there should be an






I have considered the theory of inflation targeting in terms of the theoretical aspects and as an
alternative to various other monetary policy strategies. It is also important however, to
observe how inflation targeting has working in practice. As noted previously, the 1990's saw
a number of countries adopting explicit inflation targets as the goal of monetary policy. The
main reason for introducing the targets was to establish the central banks' commitment to
achieve and maintain low rates of inflation.
This section looks at the circumstances and motivations for adopting targets in two 0 f t he
inflation-targeting countries: New Zealand and Canada. I n order to put the international
experience in perspective, there is a brief summary overview of the critical aspects of inflation
targeting in each country. Following that there is a more detailed analysis of each country's
individual experience with inflation targeting.
5.2 Summary Overview
The following section consolidates the main inflation targeting issues and considerations for
all the other countries not evaluated in this chapter. The following section attempts to draw
on the key aspects from the various inflation-targeting experiences before applying these
concepts to South Africa in chapter 6.
5.3 Motivation
The motivation for the introduction of inflation targeting has differed remarkably in the
various countries considered. In some cases the introduction of the new approach occurred as
a result of a particular event, the collapse of an exchange rate peg in the United Kingdom,
Sweden, Spain and the Czech Republic for example. In New Zealand the adoption of a much
broader package of economic reforms led to the adoption of inflation targeting. In most cases,
the switch to inflation targeting was a gradual process in response to various dissatisfactions
with the existing monetary policy strategy. This was the case in Canada, Israel and Australia.
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5.4 Transparency
It is evident from the above analysis that central banks in inflation-targeting countries
communicate in multitude of ways. Besides the legal requirements for communication policy
decisions to the government, central banks also communicate with the general public by
means of speeches and a variety of publications.
Table 2 shows that all the inflation-targeting countries attempted to enhance the transparency
and communication of their regimes in a variety of ways. The United Kingdom was the first
inflation-targeting country to start publishing an Inflation Report, which provides
comprehensive information on inflation forecasts in addition to the central bank's plans and
objectives. Since then, other inflation-targeting countries have followed suit and also started
publishing Inflation Report, e.g. Sweden, Australia, and Spain.
Israel is probably the one country that hasn't proved to be very successful in ensuring the
transparency of the inflation-targeting regime. Until recently the Central Bank of Israel had
never officially published an Inflation Report but rather released a document which discussed
a broad range of macroeconomic issues but no inflation forecasts or monetary policies. The
lack of transparency contributes to the uncertainty of the inflation-targeting regime in Israel.
5.5 Accountability
A central feature of inflation-targeting regime is the increased accountability that it places on
central banks. In general the transparency of the regime contributes to the accountability of
the central bank to the public and the government. In order for the central bank to truly be
accountable to the public and the government there needs to be some kind of penalty for non-
performance. The one country that formally sets a penalty is New Zealand where the
government has the right to dismiss the Reserve Bank's governor if the inflation targets are
breached. In Canada, the Minister of Finance has the power to revoke the Bank's decisions
by issuing a directive which may result in the governor's resignation.
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5.6 Central Bank Independence
The inflation targeting strategy calls for the inflation targets themselves to be set by a political
process in which the government consults with the central bank before making the final
decision on the appropriate target for inflation. The central bank is then given complete
freedom in the use of its policy instrument. In all the countries studied here, except the
United Kingdom, the government sets the inflation target, usually in consultation with the
central bank, and then the central bank has complete instrument independence in the
execution of the policy. In the United Kingdom, however, the Chancellor sets the inflation
target each year and then issues a directive to the Bank who is given complete instrument
independence.
5.7 Design and Implementation
The success of the inflation-targeting regime often depends on the details of implementation
and design of the policy framework. The most noticeable difference in the design of the
inflation-targeting countries studied here is the divergence on the ideal measure of inflation.
Some countries use the headline CPI because it is generally the most familiar to the public.
The lack of consensus on the ideal measure of inflation reflects a central issue of inflation
targeting, i.e . the short-run trade-off between transparency and policy flexibility.
Most countries attempt to smooth the effects of possible supply shocks by using some variant
of the CPI adjusted for the prices of certain volatile items such as food and energy, e.g. New
Zealand, Canada, Australia, and the Czech Republic. While this may help to establish the
credibility of the targets, it may deplete the transparency of monetary policy. Other countries,
such a s Israel, United Kingdom, Sweden and Spain, use a well-know measure 0 f inflation
such as the headline or all-items CPI which promotes the transparency of the framework.
Looking at figure 1, one can see that with the exception ofIsrael, and more recently the Czech
Republic, the initial inflation target or range was below 5 percent in all the countries. In most
cases, the inflation target was set as a range but even when a point target was set, e.g. Sweden
and the United Kingdom, a tolerance band was included to ensure the flexibility of the
regime.
- 31 -









NZ Canada UK Sweden Finland Australia Spain Czech Rep
Following is a consideration of the individual country experiences in New Zealand, Canada.
The first section is looking at a brief inflation history and hence the motivation for introducing
inflation targeting. The various inflation issues of transparency, accountability and the
independence of the central bank are discussed. The design and implementation of inflation
targeting was different in each country and thus we need to consider the various design issued
faced by each inflation-targeting regime. Next is the consideration ofthe main events in each
country's monetary policy during the period that inflation targets were introduced. Lastly, are
the lessons can be learnt from each of the international inflation-targeting experiences.
5.8 Lessons from Recent Inflation Targeting Experience
There are many important lessons that can be learnt from the inflation targeting experience of
the countries studied here. Although there are different lessons to be learnt from each
individual inflation-targeting regime, there are a few central lessons that were common to
most countries' experiences with inflation targets.
1. The first lesson from the international experience is that the explicit goal of price
stability has been successfully implemented in several countries. Looking at the
experiences of inflation targeting to date it is evident that all those countries adopting
price stability as the single monetary policy goal have dramatically reduced their
inflation rates since adopting inflation targets.
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2. A necessary precondition for inflation targeting is the commitment of the government
that it agrees with the ultimate goal of price stability and that it supports the inflation-
targeting framework. In fact, the inflation target is usually set jointly by the central
bank and the government in order to ensure the commitment by both to the price
stability objective.
3. Although some of the countries adopting explicit inflation targets did use headline
inflation as the basis for their inflation target, most countries used some variant of the
consumer price index. Adjusting the consumer price index for volatile components
seems to be suitable measure for inflation targeting because if has the practical
advantages of being practical and useable.
4. Experience shows that establishing the credibility of the regime is not easy and most
countries embarked on ambitious communication campaigns to ensure the
transparency and accountability of the inflation-targeting regimes. Thus, more
transparent monetary policy reporting and communication should accompany inflation
targeting by central banks.
5. In almost every case of inflation targeting it was emphasised that monetary policy
goals of price stability should be consistent with other macroeconomic policies of the
government. Indeed, international evidence shows that permanently low inflation is a
necessary pre-condition for achieving growth and employment that lasts into the
medium and long term.
6. Several countries have acknowledged the remarkable benefits of price stability as the
principle goal of monetary policy and have consequently adopted inflation targeting as
their strategy for monetary policy. We now consider the individual inflation targeting
experiences by assessing the critical aspects of each regime.
5.1.1 NEW ZEALAND
New Zealand was the first country to adopt explicit inflation targeting when the Reserve Bank
of New Zealand formally announced its commitment to price stability in February 1990.
5.1.1.1 The Rationale for Inflation Targeting
For most of the period from the first oil shock through to the late 1980's New Zealand
experienced double digit inflation. Between 1974 and 1988 cumulative inflation, on a CPI
basis, was 480 percent. In the early 1980's, a brief drop in inflation to below five percent
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occurred as a result of wage , dividend and interest rate freeze. During this period, there were
various objectives facing monetary policy that were seldom clearly specified and rarely
consistent with the aim of inflation reduction. These circumstances resulted in inflation
expectations being deeply entrenched in New Zealand society. (Brash, 1998: 2)
At the same time, there was a growing dissatisfaction with activist monetary policy. This was
part of a worldwide consensus that monetary policy is neutral in the long run and that the
central bank cannot induce a permanent increase in output by tolerating a bit more inflation.
It was at this time that certain members of the New Zealand government, the Treasury, and
the Reserve Bank saw the need to pursue a nominal anchor. The problems that other
countries were experiencing with unstable money demand seemed to discourage the monetary
targeting option. The drop in inflation in the late 1980's required more ambitious and specific
inflation objectives, which lead to an explicit definition of price stability . Under these
circumstanced it became clear that the most appropriate option would be to target inflation
directly.
The Reserve Bank of New Zealand Act, which took effect from I February 1990, announced
the Banks statutory commitment to price stability in addition to an incentive structure to
achieve it. The Act made the Reserve bank responsible and accountable for achieving its goal
of price stability.
5.1.1.2 Transparency, Accountability and Centra l Bank Independence
In addition tot he Reserve B ank Act, a Policy Targets Agreement was signed by both the
Governor and the Minister 0 fFinance and specified the targets by which monetary policy
performance could be assessed during the Governor's period of term. The Reserve Bank Act
prohibits goal independence but grants instrument independence and transparency by
distancing the central bank from the impulsiveness of the political process .
The granting of operational independence to the Bank by the Reserve Bank Act to pursue its
goal emphasises the accountability to the government in place at that time. In fact, the Act
explicitly states that the Governor is held accountable for the consequences of monetary
policy and penalties may be applied for failing to perform. T he Governor 0 f t he Reserve
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Bank may even be dismissed if his performance III attaining the mandated goal IS not
considered adequate. (Bryant, June 1996: 7)
In terms of transparency, the Governor is responsible for producing a policy statement on a
regular basis, which 0 utlines the implementation 0 f monetary policy and explains how the
objective of price stability is to be achieved. This Monetary Policy Statement is released
twice a year and provides a detailed assessment of the macroeconomic environment, inflation
trends, a provisional inflation forecast, and a survey of inflation expectations. In this way, the
desired stance of monetary policy can be assessed in the short run. (Lafrance, 1997: 247)
In addition, the continual publication of quarterly forecasts combined with regular projections
ensures that analysis is open and transparent. At the same time, transparency and credibility
are constantly enhanced by the regular scrutiny 0 f Governor 0 f t he Reserve Bank 0 f New
Zealand (RBNZ) gives a number of public speeches regarding fundamental policy issues,
some ofwhich are then printed.
According to Sherwin (1997: 272), one problem that arises with the New Zealand experience
is that accountability is compromised by the fact that the RBNZ constructs the same
measures, which evaluates its p erfonnance. 0 bviously, a situation where the central bank
constructs the series that is used to measure its own performance is clearly not ideal.
5.1.1.3 The Design and Implementation Of The Inflation Target
The Policy Target Agreements (PTA) represent the only legal implementation of the Reserve
Bank Act of 1989 and they also direct the operational aspects of New Zealand 's inflation-
targeting framework. The challenge for institutional designers in New Zealand was to
incorporate flexibility into the monetary framework while at the same time balancing
creditability with the realities ofthe volatile world economy.
In New Zealand the framework of the target is not expressed as a point but rather as a band.
The reason for this is that bands allow for flexibility in case of unexpectedly large shocks or
instances of excess economic volatility. A narrow band is favourable for influencing inflation
expectations and establishing credibility but reduces scope for stabilisation flexibility but may
seriously threaten credibility.
- 35 -
Initially, New Zealand's inflation target, expressed in terms of the twelve-month increase in
the consumer price index (CPI), announced in April 1990 was three to five percent. Although
the target was specified as a range with an explicit floor and ceiling to be adhered to, no
special emphasis was placed on a specific point. This range was lowered in December 1992
to 0 to 2 percent and then widened again in December 1996 to 0 to 3 percent, showing the
flexibility of this strategy.
McCallum (1996: 4,5) states that grven the growth concern for external pnce shocks,
government policy changes, and natural crises, the current PTA recognises that the CPI
inflation rate may on occasion move outside the 0 to 2 percent range in response to these
shocks. At the same time, even thought he Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ) monitors
several prince indices, the actual price stability target is based on the All Group Consumers
Price Index (CPI) since it is the most closely monitored and most easily understood by the
public.
The RBNZ has introduced a monetary conditions indicator (MCl) which aids in determining
the stance of monetary policy. This rationale for the MCI is based on the assumption that in
an open economy, the central bank can affect economic activity and inflation via its influence
on interest rates and exchange rates. It does so by combining an interest rate measure with an
exchange rate measure depending on their relative estimated effect on aggregate demand.
The relevant calculations show that in New Zealand, a 2 percent rise in the real trade-
weighted exchange rate is approximately equivalent to a 100 basis point increase in the real
90-day interest rate.
5.1.104 The Inflation Targeting Experience
Brash (1998: 4) divides the inflation targeting experience in New Zealand into two periods. (
The first identified as the period from 1987 to the end of 1991 where inflation fell from
double-digit levels within the relevant 0 to 2 percent target range. During this same period,
there was a fall in both the exchange rate and nominal interest rates in addition to low growth
in gross domestic product (GDP) and an increase in unemployment
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The second period is identified as the years from 1992 to the present, which has experienced a
macroeconomic environment that resembles a conventional business cycle.(see figure 2). The
initial sharp increase in growth was accompanied by falling unemployment and then
inflationary pressures arose that pushed underlying inflation past the 0 to 2 percent range in
1996. As a result there was a tightening of monetary conditions with 90-day rates up from 4.5
percent to 9.5 percent in 1994 and a substantial appreciation of the trade-weighted exchange
rate until early 1997. Recently, monetary conditions have been eased with the slowdown in
growth and the easing of inflationary pressures.
98969492908886848280
CPI ex-interest and taxes
78
Figure 2: Underlying and Headline Inflation - New Zealand
New Zealand: Inflation as Measured by the Consumer Price Index,
and Underlyiing Inflation













Source: Statistics New Zealand and Reserve Bank ofNew Zealand data.
Even though, for the first time in many years New Zealand experienced a full business cycle
without rapidly rising inflation, attaining the inflation target proved extremely challenging. In
the next section the lessons that can be learnt from the inflation targeting experience in New
Zealand are considered.
5.1.1.5 Key Lessons From The New Zealand Experience
Given that New Zealand has operated under an inflation-targeting regime for the longest, we
can identify several lessons that can be learnt from their experience with inflation targets:
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1. According to Mishkin & Posen (1997: 47), the New Zealand experience seems to
indicate that the task of reducing trend inflation while maintaining low inflation
expectations seems somewhat easier than tightly controlling the direction of inflation
within a narrow range.
2. The experience with inflation targeting in New Zealand shows that when adhering too
strictly to a narrow target range, any movements in policy instruments may be more
excessive than would be preferred by the central bank. If the pressures from these
movements becomes too great then there is potential for instrument instability.
Mishkin & Posen (1997: 47)
3. The Reserve Bank of New Zealand has found that when excessive restrictions are
placed on the exercise of the Bank's discretion, then its credibility is threatened and
the flexibility of the policy is also questionable. The Bank's direct focus on formal
accountability to the government as opposed to a broader accountability to the general
public has also questioned the credibility and transparency of the targeting regime.
(Mishkin & Posen, 1997: 47)
4. One important lesson that is emphasised by Brash (1998: 6) is that a distinction must
be made between a monetary policy goal and a monetary policy regime. Even though
the Reserve Bank Act and the Policy Target Agreements could provide a target for
monetary policy, it doesn't provide a magical formula on how to achieve this target.
At the same time, these agreements do not guarantee the credibility of the
macroeconomic environment, ensuring that price stability will endure indefinitely.
5. Bryant (1996a: 19) also indicates that the New Zealand experience teaches us that
inflation targeting does not imply the exclusion of all other macroeconomic
considerations. The forward-looking nature of the inflation-targeting regime requires
a consideration of the lags between policy actions and inflation outcomes.
Thus, the mere existence of an inflation-targeting regime does not automatically imply
credibility. Rather, we learn form the New Zealand experience that credibility needs to be
continually earned by actions and by account of policy. The Reserve Bank of New Zealand's
continual effort to keep the inflation-targeting regime as transparent as possible and to remain
accountable to the public and to government has ensured their credible status.
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5.1.2 Canada
Although inflation targeting as a means of achieving pnce level stability was already
proposed in 1988, the formal and explicit inflation target scheme only began in February 1991
when the Bank of Canada and the Minister of Finance jointly announced a series of targets.
The participation of the Minister of Finance, in this instance, was significant because it
emphasised the support ofgovernment for the goal ofprice stability.
5.1.2.1 The Rationale for Inflation Targeting
According to Lafrance (1997: 248), monetary policy in Canada has focused on the aim oflow
inflation since the early 1970's. In this period from 1975 to 1982, monetary policy was aimed
at gradually reducing inflation by targeting the narrow monetary aggregate, MI. In 1982, the
realisation that the link between Ml and nominal spending had weakened, lead to the
abandonment of targeting monetary aggregates. From 1982 to 1991, although policy
remained focused on reducing inflation, no explicit intermediate targets were applied.
Canada's formal adoption of inflation-targeting began in February 1991 when the Bank of
Canada and the government jointly announced the aim of price stability through the use of
explicit targets . Originally, explicit inflation targets were announced to establish inflationary
expectations that resulted from the price-level shock induced by the introduction of GST in
early 1991. Fundamentally, however, inflation targets indicate the longer-term commitment
of the authorities to the goal of price stability.
5.1.2 .2 Transparency, Accountability and Central Bank Independence
An essential element in establishing credibility and accountability is the regular
communication of the Bank's strategy and policy initiatives. As such, the Governing Council
of the Bank of Canada has released a semi-annual Monetary Policy Report since May 1995.
This report provides reviews on recent inflationary experiences and considers the policy
measures that have been implemented since the previous report. At the same time, it includes
a forecast path for inflation in general terms and suggests possible directions for monetary
conditions. (Lafrance,1997:249).
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In terms of accountability, the inflation-targeting regime in Canada has emphasized that
although accountability to the government is essential, the central feature of the Canadian
experience is actually accountability to the public in general. Bernanke, et al. (1990: 120)
states that it is not the actual announcement of targets itself that reduces inflationary
expectations, but rather the achievement of these targets over the medium term which
strengthens the publics' confidence in the central bank.
According to Mishkin and Posen (1997: 54), Canada's framework for inflation targeting gives
the Bank the freedom to attain the target as long as it can transparently justify its actions to
the public. Thus, in terms of central bank independence, the Bank of Canada has full
operational independence in the use of its monetary policy instruments. However, the Bank
of Canada is not free to choose the goal of monetary policy, i.e. it does not have complete
goal independence but rather shares the responsibility with the Minister ofFinance who make
the final decision on the goal of monetary policy.
Although the Bank has the freedom to implement day-to-day monetary policy, the Bank of
Canada Acts grants the Minister ofFinance the power to revoke the Bank's decisions through
the publication of a directive. The issue of a directive not only requires extreme
circumstances but may also have severe repercussions. That is, although a directive has thus
far never been issued, the issue of such a directive does imply the resignation of the Governor.
5.1.2.3 The Design and Implementation Of The Inflation Target
While the inflation target is defined for the overall CPI, the Bank of Canada has focused on its
near-term policy actions on the CPI excluding food and energy prices and the effects of
indirect tax changes which are considered to be more representative of underlying inflation.
The reason for these exclusions is that the components in questions are often susceptible to
sharp temporary movements that should not be corrected by monetary policy. A target range
of 1 to 3 percent was initially specified in February 1991 and then reaffirmed by the
government and the Bank on the appointment of a new Governor in December 1993. The
target range that had been specified to the end of 1995 was extended a further three years and
was then renewed in February 1998 until February 2001. (Lafrance, 1997: 248, 249)
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The inflation-targeting framework is forward-looking in nature as it attempts to recognize the
lags in the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. Monetary conditions represent the
developments in both short-term interest rates and exchange rates . Canada was the first
inflation-targeting regime to introduce the Monetary Condition's Indicator (MCI) which
captures the relative effects of short-term interest rate and exchange rate movements on
aggregate demand. Thus, in Canada, a 100-basis-point increase in the 90-day interest rate
will affect aggregate demand via an estimated 3 percent increase in the real effective
exchange rate .
5.1.2.4 The Inflation Targeting Experience
At the time that inflation targeting was implemented in Canada in 1991, the inflation rate as
measured by the consumer price index (CPI) was 5.9 percent. Initially, the aim was to reduce
inflation to progressively lower levels to establish a favourable economic environment. By
December 1993, the inflation rate had declined to 2 percent and the Bank and the government
agreed to extend the targets for three more years to the end of 1998 with a target range of 1 to
3 percent. By February 1998 inflation had been sufficiently contained within the range and
the existing targets were extended to December 2001.
5.1.2.5 Key Lessons from the Canadian Experience
There are several lessons to be learnt from the Canadian experience with inflation targeting:
1. The success of the Canadian experience can largely be attributed to the emphasis
placed by the regime on accountability to the general public as opposed to meeting
specified obligations. Although tight constraints on central banks are necessary to
establish credibility, the Canadian experience shows that transparency of policy is also
important in establishing credibility.
2. The low inflation record under Canadian inflation-targeting regime can also be
attributed to the close informal links that have been established between the Bank of
Canada and the Minister of Finance . This relationship was enhanced by the Bank's
strong and increasing commitment to transparency and the communication of
monetary policy strategy to the public.
3. Thiessen (March 1997a: 3) emphasizes the ability of the Canadian inflation-targeting
regime to contribute in focusing expectations of future inflation. Previously, in
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periods of high inflation, any demand or price shocks would have a negative effect on
inflation expectations and contribute to upward pressures on inflation. By publishing
inflation forecasts, inflation expectations are now alloyed in times of price shocks and
inflation fears are largely alleviated.
4. Another lesson to be learnt from the Canadian experience is that even though the
inflation-targeting regime was allowed to deviate from the target range, it still
managed to keep inflation low and stable. As a result of this flexibility, Canada's
good inflation performance has still been maintained even in the event of unforeseen
supply shocks.
5. Mishkin and Posen (1997: 70) state that the Bank of Canada has adhered equally to
both the floor and ceiling of the target range and is thus considered to be assisting in
dampening business cycle fluctuations. As a result, the Bank of Canada has often
been able to ease monetary conditions when the economy has weakened by appealing
to the inflation targets.
6. Lastly, the Canadian experience shows that, by responding to the trend of inflation
relative to the target range, monetary policy can act as an important stabilizer for the
economy. As such, in times of excess demand when capacity is pressurized, the
targets effectively call for the Bank to tighten monetary policy. Similarly, when
demand is weak, the targets call for the Bank to ease monetary policy.
5.8 Conclusion
While clearly Canada, New Zealand and South Africa are at different stages of economic
development, they are all relatively open economies (with exports 25% of GDP in South
Africa and 33% in New Zealand and 37% in Canada) with some similar features
(manufacturing is about 25% ofGDP in Canada and South Africa and 18% in New Zealand).
Consequently, it is useful to compare the current South African evidence relating to the key
issues relating to the desirability of inflation targeting to the pre-target evidence for Canada
and New Zealand.
Canada and New Zealand appear to have been two quite different countries in the pre-target
periods. Yet, both countries have enjoyed greater real economic stability since 'adopting an
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inflation target. In addition, both countries enjoyed a reduction in average inflation with the
adoption of the inflation target in a manner that is consistent with a falling inflationary bias.
The South African economy, on the basis of the VAR evidence, looks more similar to pre-
target New Zealand: in both countries exchange rate shocks and CPI shocks were
substantially negative. Again, in both countries exchange rate shocks were an economically
important determinant of the CPl.
There is, however, one crucial difference between the behaviour of the pre-target New
Zealand economy and the recent South African experience. In New Zealand, during both the
pre and post inflation targeting periods, lagged exchange rates were an important determinant
of real output. This suggests that the volatility of the exchange rate was not associated with
the automatic stabilization of IS shocks. In South Africa, on the other hand, while the
exchange rate has been volatile and an important determinant of the CPI, it has not been an
important determinant of output. Thus this evidence suggests that the exchange rate has been
providing important automatic stabilization of IS shocks in South Africa. The adoption of an
inflation target would force South Africa to forego this automatic stabilization, which implies
more volatile real economic activity. In addition, South Africa does not have a strong and
predictable linkage between the CPI inflation rate and monetary aggregates. This could
present problems of instrument instability for South African monetary policy under an
inflation target; problems similar to those experienced by New Zealand (see Mishkin and
Posen[1997]).
The issue of inflation targeting effect on the flexibility of the exchange rate is important
because, the correlation between exchange rate changes and all of the popular measures of
inflation in South Africa has been substantially negative and has become more so most
recently. Apparently, IS shocks are becoming more important in the South African economy.
A monetary policy aimed at stabilizing the CPI inflation rate in the face of frequent and





The aim of this study was to examine the appropriateness of inflation targeting as the future
monetary policy strategy for South Africa. South Africa evidently needs to prepare itself for
the new age of inflation targeting. Therefore, producing information that will determine
whether the South African Reserve Bank has been correct in their adoption of this framework,
and to propose an alternative, more all-encompassing option.
The aims included the following
• To analyse the potential advantages of incorporating such a framework into South
African monetary policy.
• To define and analyse the concept, Inflation Targeting
• To define requisite preconditions for the adoption of Inflation Targeting, and to assess
whether or not these preconditions are met in South Africa.
• To draw lessons for South Africa from international experience
• To determine whether Inflation Targeting, given South Africa's unique characteristics,
is suitable to South Africa and can provide the benefits proposed by its advocates.
South Africa is indeed different from any other developing countries with the following
distinguishing features:-
1. The racial and cultural heterogeneity
2. The "two nations in one" description
3. The pressure for redistribution of income and wealth, which results in militant
labour union actions and unjustifiably labour-friendly legislation. This results
in disproportionately high total real labour costs , and rising nominal labour
costs. These, as well as other, oddities bring on high unemployment.
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South Africa is quite unlike other emerging market economies, given that both the real wage
level and efforts to boost it are highly insensitive to the existence of high and possibly
growing unemployment.
Monetary policy aiming at price stability id burdened with the need to counterbalance these
cost-push pressures. Particularly high real interest rates would depress investment as well as
economic growth.
The chain of causality may become exceedingly detrimental and create a vicious circle.
When mixture of low employment, low growth levels, a restrictive labour force, and fears of
further government policies redistribute, arouse misgivings and reservations among foreign
investors, the resultant capital outflows and downward pressures on the exchange value ofthe
currency, give rise to price level pressures and inflation.
The above in my opinion, constitutes a deep-seated structural problem in the South African
economy that works against the simple application of Inflation Targeting in the manner of
more homogenous, closely knit and sophisticated societies, such as those of the UK and New
Zealand. These problems go further than just to complicate the forecastibility of inflation in
South Africa.
6.2 A Description Of Inflation Targeting Framework
Chapter 2 defined and explained the concept of Inflation Targeting. The adoption of an
Inflation Targeting model signifies a public announcement by monetary authorities for the
attainment of a specified, quantified inflation target over a certain time period, on the
understanding that price stability is the long-run goal of monetary policy.
The various definitions of Inflation targeting incorporate identifying features of the
framework and highlight requirements to be met to facilitate its application. For example,
while Inflation Targeting typically entails increased communication with the public, calls for
the abandonment of other nominal anchors, and increases transparency, these elements are
factors that the authorities are required or encouraged to put in place as a foundation for the
framework and its implementation. While these elements are important, they are not,
however, unique to Inflation Targeting. It is important to distinguish between defining
- 45-
Inflation Targeting and identifying the features of monetary policy needed for the framework
to be implemented.
6.3 The Case For Inflation Targeting
Chapter 3 showed that, potentially, Inflation Targeting has strong advantages. The provision
of a nominal anchor for inflationary expectations, along with the effects of credibility,
openness and transparency, are undeniably important advantages ofInflation Targeting. They
can, however, be achieved without operating in an Inflation Targeting environment. Creating
a public understanding of the stand of monetary policy can be achieved in other monetary
regimes.
As Mishkin explains, various shortcomings exist within the framework, many of which are
relevant to developing nations. Factors such as the requirement of not anchoring the
exchange rate, as well as the effect of government-administered prices (which are of
particular concern in South Africa), can complicate the framework and cause the potential
advantages to be outweighed.
6.4 Requirements Of Inflation Targeting
The application of Inflation Targeting is based on a variety of requirements. Factors such as
an absence of fiscal dominance and the role of monetary policy are vital in deciding on the
implementation ofInflation Targeting. The nature of the Central Bank independence impacts
on the implementation of Inflation Targeting. While these factors are important, uniqueness
of South Africa should also be taken into consideration (given that their effects cannot be
clearly determined), with an understanding that these factors can impose heavily on the
success of the framework.
6.5 The International Experience
International, Inflation Targeting has proven to be successful. The method of its
implementation differs across countries. While the majority of countries that have
implemented Inflation Targeting have seen falling inflation rates, whether and to what degree
these decreases are related to Inflation Targeting is uncertain. Specific concerns exist for
developing economies, given the greater degree ofvolatility in these economies. Factors such
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as shallow capital markets, and reliance on seigniorage revenue IS concern specifically
relating to developing economies. While inflation rates have been decreased in the
developing economies analyzed in this chapter, the sustainability of these results cannot yet
be determined. The main conclusion is that each country needs to be considered on its merits,
depending on the circumstances in the country concerned. Policy makers need to determine
factors such as the sacrifice ration to ensure that the framework is appropriate, and to decide
whether the country would not be better off focusing on an acceptable balance between
growth and inflation.
6.6 South Africa And Inflation Targeting
The more eclectic approach used by the South African Reserve Bank was abandoned in favor
of Inflation Targeting. The authorities, anxious to prove that South Africa is as economically
sophisticated as other more developed countries, may seem to have embarked with an
unjustifiable haste on a framework that is not obviously suited to the economy. Possible
sources of problems with the framework, include inter-alia South Africa's high and volatile
inflation rates, structural changes to its economy that impinge on the authorities inflation
forecasting ability, and socio-political factors, resulting in diverging views on the role of
economic policy.
The nature of inflation in South Africa is an additional complicating factor. While diverging
opinions exist of the cost-push/demand-pull nature of inflation, reference in the paper show
strong empirical support for the view that inflation in South Africa is fundamentally a cost-
push phenomenon. Radical trade union behavior within a highly rigid labour market acts as a
deterrent to employment creation, while pressures for higher real wage levels stimulate
inflation. Organized labour's role in inflation creation works against the efforts of the South
African Reserve Bank. As organized labour does not perceive a real material interest in the
attainment of the inflation target, its efforts will continue to complicate the inflation reduction
process. Further complexities arise from the fact that the South African wage levels are
insensitive to growing unemployment, as well as from resentment within income groups.
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6.7 Recommendations
The analysis of Inflation Targeting in South Africa has highlighted problems and
incongruities in the new framework. Inflation volatility, large differences in the inflation
rates, structural changes within the economy that impact on inflation forecastibility, and the
fact that inflation in the 1990 ' s has been essentially a cost-push phenomenon, toss the
appropriateness of the framework for South Africa into uncertainty. Because the views, given
problems unique to the country, not all stakeholders have welcomed the framework.
The authorities in the face of a failed GEAR, sought to implement a new policy, a policy that
has been embraced internationally, a policy that has been implemented in developed and
developing economies alike, but a policy that indeed not suited to South Africa.
A framework is required that incorporates considerations pertinent to South Africa's unique
and difficult circumstances. If an inflation target is to be set as part of an overall and
comprehensive GEAR-type projection of South Africa's capabilities, encompassing attainable
outcomes for growth, employment and redistribution, to which organized labour has seen its
way clear to subscribe, rather than as an exclusive price stability objective, set in apparent
disregard of everything else .
The proposed framework, while incorporating many of the advantages that Inflation
Targeting' boasts, such as transparency, communication and accountability, can be attained
within a broader "national intention" . An additional advantage of such an approach, clearly
lacking in Inflation Targeting, is that the broader framework involved will have the potential
to attract the active participation of organized labour by specifying outcomes thought
realizable for growth and employment concurrent with moderate targets for inflation.
Stakeholders, being the labour market, business and government, may be presented with a
limited "menu" of alternative options. Based on differing priorities, a target of, for example,
two percent inflation combined with three percent realizable economic growth (and potential
for increasing unemployment) may appear inferior to a less demanding target for inflation,
combined with a higher real growth rate4 .
3 While these advantages are integral to Inflation Targeting, they are not exclusive to it.
4 Green (1996) suggests a mildly, similar concept, namely, targets for both inflation and growth
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This means that, having looked at various combinations of employment, real growth and
inflation, and having the "most attractive" one, inflation is turned into the target: it may then,
realistically, be hoped that the projected employment and output outcomes in that
combination will also be realized. In this case stakeholders will have had the opportunity to
express themselves on the relative desirability of these various "good things".
The policy effectively involves a compromise with organized labour (in that employment
needs will have been duly recognized alongside the need for some moderate target for
inflation. In exchange for this, labour may be expected to moderate its aggression in their
wage negotiations and to allow more labour market flexibility. Following from this, due to a
more employer-friendly labour market, employers will be more likely to invest in labour and
to de-emphasize labour-replacing capital equipment.
Based on the findings of the research study, the following recommendation is offered:
South Africa, with its unique and difficult circumstances needs an inflation target within a
GEAR-type projection ofpossible outcomes for employment, real growth and price stability
inflation, to arrive at an acceptable "tailor-made"framework.
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APPENDIX A
A.I INFLATIONARY EXPECTATIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA
Inflation Targeting provides a nominal anchor for inflationary expectations . This is tha main
reason for the adoption of Inflation Targeting in both South Africa and other developing
countries. This section analyses the trend in expectations, with the use of research undertaken
through the Bureau of Economic Research at Stellenbosch University .
Figure A1.1 Inflation expectations : third quarter 2000
Healine CPI inflation CPIX inflation
2000 2001 2002 2000 2001 2002
Financial Sector 5.5 6.6 5.4 7.5 6.6 5.7
NF business 6.8 7.0 7.2 7.6 7.7 7.8
Labour 6.3 6.3 5.8 7.1 7.0 6.7
Average Above 6.2 6.6 6.1 7.4 7.1 6.7
Households 7.5 - - - - -
Grand Average 6.5 - - - - -
Non financial business sector
Source BER 2000
In the third quarter of2000, expectations regarding the attainment of the target were low. The
financial sector was the only party who expected the target for 2000 to be hit, while both
labour and business expected the target to be missed. It is valuable to note that in this quarter
both labour and the financial sector 's sentiments were such that they believed that inflation
would fall from 2000 to 2002
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